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Weaponized Police Drones and Their Effect on Police Use 
of Force 
Kyle Stelmack* 
For nearly 25 years, claims of police use of excessive force during the 
“seizure” of a person have been analyzed under the “reasonableness” standard of 
the Fourth Amendment.1 On thousands of occasions, courts have looked at the 
“totality of the circumstances” surrounding these cases and have taken into great 
consideration the tense and changing environments in which police find 
themselves, as well as the need for officers to make quick decisions under such 
circumstances.2 How then, would a court react to an excessive force claim where 
the police apply the force, but are not physically present when the force is applied? 
Armed police drones present exactly this dilemma. 
Drones have been put to use by federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies throughout the country, primarily for surveillance purposes.3 Although 
these police drones are not equipped with any type of weapon, many are capable of 
being armed with such technology and several weaponized police drones have been 
developed.4 Drones capable of deploying tasers, pepper spray, paint balls, and 
plastic bullets have already been constructed,5 and law enforcement’s future 
implementation of this type of technology is not outside the realm of possibility.6 
Widespread use of these types of police drones could significantly alter the way 
that courts typically review use of force claims. This is true not only because they 
remove the officer from the tense environment that has been so influential in past 
                                                          
* J.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2016. The author would like to 
thank Mom, Dad, and Tyler for all of their love and encouragement. 
1 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
2 Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 864–65 (2014). 
3 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 6–7 (2011) [hereinafter ACLU 
Domestic Drone Report]. 
4 See Skunk Riot Control Copter, DESERT WOLF, http://www.desert-wolf.com/dw/products/ 
unmanned-aerial-systems/skunk-riot-control-copter.html; Susanna Kim, Texas Start-up Tasers Intern 
Via Stun-Copter to Spark Discussion About Tech and SXSW, ABC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/intern-tasered-drone-sxsw-explains-feels-zapped/story?id=22848505. 
5 Id. 
6 ACLU Domestic Drone Report, supra note 3, at 11. 
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excessive use of force decisions, but because they also add new concerns to the 
analysis that could present substantial challenges for the courts.7 
The following Article will take a closer look at this new type of technology 
and how it would affect a decision in an excessive force case. Section I will 
describe what a drone is and the capabilities of CUPID and the Skunk Riot Control 
Copter. Section II is a discussion regarding the history of the use of force standard 
and the issues that it has created. Section III moves onto a discussion concerning 
the new factors and concerns armed police drones raise and how they could affect 
the current reasonable use of force precedent. Section IV suggests a standard 
allowing for the use of force by a UAS only in situations where it is reasonable to 
prevent an imminent threat to public safety.  
I. WHAT IS AN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM? 
An unmanned aerial system (“UAS”) is a “system whose components 
includes the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned 
aircraft.”8 These systems normally include three basic components: the unmanned 
aircraft, the “ground control system,” and the operator.9 Although many unmanned 
aircraft can be pre-programmed to fly autonomously, this Article will focus on 
drones controlled remotely, using a ground control station by an operator. Thus, the 
UAS that is the topic of this Article would include the unmanned aircraft, the 
control system, and a police officer (i.e., operator) that would be controlling the 
aircraft and deciding whether or not to deploy the weapons.  
In order to understand how a UAS could bring about an excessive force claim, 
it is essential to first grasp the capabilities of the unmanned aircraft, or drone. The 
Department of Defense defines drones as “powered aerial vehicles sustained in 
flight by aerodynamic lift . . . and guided without a flight crew.”10 This is a very 
basic definition that encompasses hundreds of different “unmanned aerial 
vehicles.”11 Drones can come in a variety of shapes and sizes ranging from the 
                                                          
7 Peter Olsthoorn & Lamber Royakkers, Risks and Robots—Some Ethical Issues, available at 
http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME11/Olsthoorn-ISME2011.pdf. 
8 Suraj G. Gupta, Review of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), 2 INT’L J. OF ADVANCED 
RESEARCH IN COMPUTER AND ENGINEERING TECH. 1646 (2013), available at http:// 
www.uxvuniversity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Review-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-System-UAS.pdf. 
9 Id. 
10 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (June 3, 2003), http://www.defense.gov/ 
specials/uav2002/. 
11 Id. 
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dimensions of a small airplane to that of a hummingbird.12 Historically, for both 
military and police, the most common use of drones has been for surveillance,13 
due to their capacity for housing a wide range of surveillance technology, including 
high powered lenses, GPS, automated object detection, and gigapixel cameras.14 
A. Weaponized Police Drones 
Although it appears unlikely that police drone weaponry will ever rise to the 
lethal levels employed by the military, the idea of non-lethal weapons systems 
being attached to police drones is not out of the realm of possibility, and, in fact, 
has already been seriously contemplated.15 In 2007, Michael Buscher, the CEO of 
Vanguard Defense Industries, which had provided a drone to a Houston area law 
enforcement agency, stated that the drones provided were designed to carry 
weapons.16 Buscher went on to say that these “less lethal systems” for police could 
fire tasers and beanbags known as “stun batons.”17 The sheriff of this particular 
agency made it clear that this drone would not carry weapons,18 but the capability 
exists, and other manufacturers have been able to demonstrate what such 
capabilities look like. 
Desert Wolf, a South African company, and Chaotic Moon, a Texas 
corporation, have each developed a drone that is capable of deploying forms of 
non-lethal weaponry.19 Although neither has been distributed to an American law 
enforcement agency,20 they are both useful in exemplifying how this technology 
could be used. 
Desert Wolf’s design, known as the Skunk Riot Control Copter, features a 
system that includes four high capacity paint ball barrels each capable of firing 20 
                                                          
12 ACLU Domestic Drone Report, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
13 See id. at 1; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, supra note 10. 
14 Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues to Erode 
our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2013). 
15 Id. at 22; Roy Carroll, Drone Warfare: A New Generation of Deadly Unmanned Weapons, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012, 11:40 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/02/drone-warfare-
unmanned-weapons. 
16 Stephen Dean, New Police Drone Near Houston Could Carry Weapons, CLICK2HOUSTON 
(Nov. 10, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.click2houston.com/news/New-Police-Drone-Near-Houston-
Could-Carry-Weapons/4717922. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Skunk Riot Control Copter, supra note 4; Kim, supra note 4. 
20 Id. 
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balls per second.21 These balls can be filled with pepper spray, colored dye, or solid 
plastic bullets, and the device is also equipped with “blinding lasers.”22 At its 
maximum capacity the Skunk Riot Control Copter can fire up to 80 balls per 
second and, as is stated on the company’s website, can stop “any crowd in its 
tracks.”23 The drone is also equipped with a thermal camera, full HD color camera, 
as well as a full telemetry data link and long range control link.24 The control 
system for the drone allows the user to have full control over the planning and 
execution of the drone’s functions, includes a real-time video link, and, importantly 
for the purposes of this Article, records full flight logs and mission notes, which 
include a video and audio recording of the operator while in use.25 
Unlike Desert Wolf, whose goal it is to distribute the Skunk Copter 
commercially, Chaotic Moon designed their drone to demonstrate the capabilities 
of this type of technology, and the low cost at which it can be produced.26 The 
device, called the Chaotic Unmanned Personal Intercept Drone, or CUPID, was 
built with many “common, off the shelf parts,” and has the capability to shoot a 
barbed wire taser that could deliver up to 80,000 volts.27 The taser was able to 
subdue a 26-year-old male intern, on who it was tested, and had a safety 
mechanism in place that would allow for a manual override of the taser. 
The capabilities of both of these devices are comparable to the described 
capabilities of the drone manufactured by Vanguard Defense Industries, and in use 
by a law enforcement agency outside of Houston, but not yet implemented. While 
there are no drones in the United States operating with these non-lethal weapon 
systems, it is clear that this is not only possible, but also becoming an attractive and 
inexpensive option for law enforcement.28 With that said, there is a significant 
chance that drones will move beyond strictly surveillance uses and move into 
intervention in situations on the ground.29 
                                                          
21 Skunk Riot Control Copter, supra note 4. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Kim, supra note 4. 
27 Id. 
28 ACLU Domestic Drone Report, supra note 3. 
29 Id. 
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It may be difficult to imagine how a UAS could intervene in a ground 
situation, and until it is put to use we will be unable to know for sure. However, by 
examining the technology and its capabilities, it is possible to predict how police 
departments may utilize them. The first and perhaps most obvious application is for 
crowd control, and in fact the Skunk Riot Control Copter is marketed for precisely 
this purpose.30 In these situations, the drones would likely be used around and 
within large crowds while the operator monitors the situation from a safe distance. 
The police could then use the weaponry available on the UAS to control the 
crowd’s movement, employing pepper spray or rubber bullets to prevent the crowd 
from moving past certain points. It is also quite possible for these drones to target 
individuals within the crowd, firing a taser or stun-baton to halt an individual’s 
movement until officers arrive. 
Although crowd control is the most obvious use for a UAS, it is possible to 
imagine situations where it could be applied to individualized setting outside of a 
large crowd. Imagine perhaps a situation in which the police receive a report of a 
suspicious person or suspicious activity occurring in a public area. Before an 
officer is dispatched, a UAS could be utilized to arrive on the scene first, allowing 
the operator to survey the situation before the officers arrive on the scene. Using 
the audio equipment, the officer could announce the police presence, follow the 
individual if he or she attempts to flee, and, if the situation calls for it, use the 
weaponry to prevent the individual from moving any farther or causing any person 
harm.  
It is important to remember that these situations are hypothetical, and there is 
no way to truly know how a particular police department would choose to use a 
UAS in a crowd control or individual arrest situation. These are, however, 
examples of the more likely situations in which a UAS could be deployed and 
cause a seizure of an individual, and thus lead to the problems that will be 
discussed below.  
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE “USE OF FORCE” DOCTRINE 
Before exploring the legal background of police use of force, it is important to 
remember that law enforcement’s use of a UAS against an individual represents the 
final link in a chain of events—a chain that gives rise to numerous legal and social 
concerns that are not at-issue in this Article. And despite the fact that several law 
enforcement agencies across the country have already purchased non-weaponized 
                                                          
30 Skunk Riot Control Copter, supra note 4. 
  
 
 
U S E  O F  F O R C E  A N D  W E A P O N I Z E D  P O L I C E  D R O N E S 
Volume XV – Spring 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.172 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
281 
drones, deployment of these devices remains a hotly contested issue.31 Their 
application for surveillance purposes have raised significant Fourth Amendment 
concerns involving illegal searches, while state legislatures scramble to set limits 
on their use.32 Assuming legislatures do allow the police to deploy an armed UAS, 
there will have to be significant discussions as to how to best train operators to 
ensure that their instruction on constitutional standards is adequate.33 Only after 
these preliminary issues are addressed will an encounter between a police UAS and 
an individual necessitate a determination of whether or not reasonable force was 
used. 
Regardless, drones carrying non-lethal weapons pose an interesting problem. 
If law enforcement agencies were to deploy such drones during the course of an 
arrest, they could potentially be used to subdue the suspect. In this type of situation 
it is no longer a police officer who is physically applying force to a subject, but 
instead a drone operator, who could be miles away from the situation, applying the 
force through the use of a drone. How then, in a situation where a drone operator 
uses the drone’s weaponry to “stop a suspect in their tracks,”34 would a court 
determine if the force was “reasonable”? To answer this, one must first look to the 
standards already set regarding the use of force.  
Excessive force claims against police officers typically arise under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.35 In order for a plaintiff to be successful in a § 1983 claim, he or she must 
show that the police officer, in using force, deprived the plaintiff of a protected 
constitutional or statutory right.36 In reviewing these cases, courts first determine 
the specific constitutional right at-issue, and then judge the claim in reference to the 
“specific constitutional standard, which governs that right.”37 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has made clear that, in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop, the 
                                                          
31 Somini Sengupta, Rise of Drones in U.S. Drives Efforts to Limit Police Use, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/technology/rise-of-drones-in-us-spurs-efforts-to-
limit-uses.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
32 Id. 
33 See Editorial Board, Deadly Force in Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/opinion/deadly-force-in-philadelphia.html?hp&action=click&pgtype= 
Homepage&module=c-column-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=c-
column-top-span-region&_r=0 (discussing the Justice Department suggestions regarding training on the 
use of force in the Philadelphia Police Department). 
34 See Skunk Riot Control Copter, supra note 4. 
35 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
36 Id. 
37 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 
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excessive force claim normally invokes the Fourth Amendment,38 which guarantees 
people a right “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . 
seizures.”39 Thus, in these situations the claim will be analyzed under the 
“reasonableness standard” of the Fourth Amendment.40 
Before performing any reasonableness analysis, it is first necessary to 
determine whether or not a seizure of the person has actually occurred. The 
Supreme Court tells us that for a seizure of a person to occur it is necessary for 
there to be some “show of authority” by police, such that a “reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”41 Although a necessary 
component, this show of authority is not alone sufficient to constitute a seizure, and 
requires with it either a use of physical force by police or submission by the suspect 
to that authority.42 
Applying this two-prong test to a UAS, it is likely that the deployment of 
these weapons would indeed amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
Beginning first with a “show of authority,” although no police officer would be 
physically present, the drones themselves can be equipped with audio equipment, 
making it possible for the operator to communicate to the suspects, and relaying to 
them information demonstrative of police authority. Further, the nature of the non-
lethal weaponry not only shows law enforcement’s authority to the point where an 
individual’s movement is restrained, but can also constitute the additional physical 
force needed to prove that a seizure has occurred. Several cases from various 
jurisdictions have found that the intentional use of pepper spray against groups of 
protesters or individuals has constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.43 
Similarly, the use of a taser against an individual constitutes a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.44 
Once it has been determined that a seizure has occurred, it is then appropriate 
to shift focus to the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. This 
                                                          
38 Id. at 395. 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
40 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
41 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
42 Id. at 626–27. 
43 See Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It 
would be clear to a reasonable officer that using pepper spray against the protesters was excessive under 
the circumstances.”); Marbet v. City of Portland, 2003 WL 23540258, at *10 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2003) 
(stating that use of pepper spray to control protester movement constituted a seizure). 
44 See Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 Fed. Appx. 595, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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standard requires a balancing test, where on one hand the court considers the 
“nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights,” 
and on the other it takes into consideration the “importance of the governmental 
interests alleged.”45 During an arrest this reasonableness standard plays out over the 
course of two different stages. First, it is reasonable for police to seize an individual 
when there exists probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot.46 The Court has held however that “the reasonableness of a particular seizure 
depends not only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out.”47 Thus, not 
only must the seizure itself be reasonable but the force used in carrying out the 
seizure must also be reasonable.48 Although it has long been settled that during the 
course of an arrest some form of force or coercion will be necessary,49 it has 
become increasingly difficult to determine what amount of force is appropriate.50 
Tennessee v. Garner was one of the first instances in which the Supreme 
Court dealt directly with the question of what amount of police force is reasonable 
during the course of an arrest.51 In Garner, Memphis police officers, responding to 
a burglary, encountered Edward Garner standing outside the home.52 The officers 
stated that they did not see Garner with a weapon, nor did they believe he was 
armed.53 Upon ordering him to halt, Garner began to climb over a backyard fence 
at which point, fearing that he would elude capture, was shot by the responding 
officers.54 Although the officers were acting under a Tennessee statute that allowed 
any force necessary to affect an arrest, the Supreme Court held that the use of 
deadly force in this situation was unreasonable.55 The Court was careful to 
articulate that it was the facts of this case that made the seizure, specifically the 
taking of Garner’s life, unreasonable, and that when determining the 
reasonableness of a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes it is important to 
                                                          
45 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 
(1983)). 
46 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). 
47 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
51 Id. at 3. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 4. 
55 Id. at 11. 
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consider whether “the totality of the circumstances justified a particular . . . 
seizure.”56 
In Garner, this “totality of the circumstances” approach was confined to a 
situation where the use of force was lethal.57 Four years later, in Graham v. Connor 
the Court was asked to apply this approach to a use of non-lethal force.58 The 
Graham Court attempted to clarify the “totality of the circumstances” analysis 
dictated in Garner by proposing several factors that should be taken into 
consideration, such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect is posing an 
immediate threat to the officers, and whether he is actively resisting or fleeing from 
arrest.59 The Court also emphasized that this inquiry is an objective one, and must 
be looked at from the perspective of the officer at the scene, not in hindsight and 
also disregarding any underlying motivation or intent of the particular officer.60 
Finally, the Court emphasized that in determining the reasonableness of the seizure 
the court must give “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.”61 This language, on which courts have relied heavily, will be pertinent to 
the introduction of weaponized police drones. 
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning police force, and one 
that could have a significant influence on decisions involving drones, is the case of 
Scott v. Harris.62 In Scott, a ten-mile high-speed car chase, initiated by the 
defendant, was brought to an end when Officer Scott used the bumper of his patrol 
car to force Harris off the road, resulting in serious injuries.63 The Court, per 
Justice Scalia, determined that Scott’s actions were reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, and in doing so reaffirmed that there is not bright-line rule for these 
situations and that courts must “slosh [their] way through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness.’”64 What is interesting from the Court’s decision in Scott, and 
what could be highly influential in any case involving police drones, is that the 
                                                          
56 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9. 
57 Id. 
58 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 396–97. 
61 Id. at 396. 
62 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). 
63 Id. at 1772–73. 
64 Id. at 1778. 
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Court reached its conclusion in large part by viewing a video recording of the entire 
incident.65 In fact, the presence of this video led the Supreme Court to make its 
own factual determination about the events that led to Officer Scott’s use of force, 
enabling the Court to make a reasonableness decision based off these factual 
determinations.66 
It is clear from these decisions that the determination of whether a use of 
force is excessive is volatile, and without a bright-line rule it is difficult to 
determine how courts will decide individual cases.67 However, there is no 
indication that this standard will change before any type of weaponized drone is 
deployed on the street. Therefore, this standard, at least initially, will be used for 
any type of excessive force claims involving drones. 
III. THE CONSIDERATION OF NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
The Graham court, in analyzing a totality of the circumstances approach laid 
out several factors that should be taken into account when determining whether the 
police used reasonable force.68 Although these factors are noticeably absent from 
the Court’s decision in Scott,69 their description of reasonableness as a “factbound 
morass”70 indicates that there are factors surrounding the event in question that 
must be taken into consideration. Many of these factors, such as the severity of the 
crime and the immanency of harm to others, would carry over into an analysis of 
the use of force involving a drone. Yet, there are also new factors, such as the 
proximity of the officer and certain psychological factors like moral disengagement 
that could have a significant impact on future decisions. 
A. The Physical Location of the Officer 
Courts have cited the Supreme Court’s statement in Graham, giving 
“allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,” on over 2,300 
                                                          
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1140 (2008). 
68 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
69 Harmon, supra note 67, at 1134–35. 
70 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778. 
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occasions.71 Although this language is absent from the Court’s decision in Scott, it 
is clear that courts throughout the country continue to rely on this language to 
determine whether or not an officer used “reasonable force.”72 Deference given to 
police in excessive force situations is often attributed to this language, and it serves 
as what courts and juries consider to be the inherent nature of police encounters.73  
Drones could alter the way police encounters are viewed in very substantial 
ways. Perhaps most obvious, as stated previously, is the removal of an officer from 
the actual encounter, and instead replacing him or her with a drone operator 
potentially miles away from the scene.74 Not only does this fact eliminate an 
imminent threat to the safety of the drone operator, but it also eliminates several of 
the environmental factors that are taken into consideration when determining 
whether police force was reasonable. Research has shown that geographic area, the 
events leading up to the arrest, and the suspect’s demeanor are factors that lead an 
officer to perceive a situation or suspect as dangerous.75 These factors elicit certain 
psychological responses, including stress and anxiety that affect that amount of 
force an officer uses.76 These factors are all taken into consideration when giving 
allowance to the split-second decisions officers make in “circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”77  
Drones, by their very nature, eliminate the need for some of these factors to 
be taken into consideration. A drone operator is no longer in the environment, but 
is instead outside the environment of the actual police encounter. Drone operators 
are removed from direct contact with environmental factors that lead to the stress 
and anxiety that oftentimes results in the use of force, especially excessive force.78 
                                                          
71 Stoughton, supra note 2, at 864–65. 
72 See Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012); Schoettle v. Jefferson County, 
Mo., 2014 WL 1117587 (E.D. Mo. 2014); Estate of Williams v. Indiana State Police, 26 F. Supp. 3d 824 
(S.D. Ind. 2014).  
73 Stoughton, supra note 2, at 865; Harmon, supra note 67, at 1169. 
74 All UAV Datasheets, UAV GLOBAL, http://www.uavglobal.com/shadowhawk/ (listing the 
Shadowhawk drone as having a range capability of up to 24 kilometers). 
75 See Geoffrey P. Albert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Reasonable Man? Police 
and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 495 (1994) (describing how officers use of 
force depends on their environments); Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and 
Evidence of Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 23, 27 (William A, Geller & Hans Toch eds., 
1996) (describing how situational factors affect the use of police force). 
76 See generally Seth D. DuCharme, The Search for Reasonableness in Use-of-Force Cases: 
Understand the Effects of Stress on Perception and Performance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525 (2002). 
77 Id. 
78 Olsthoorn & Royakkers, supra note 7. 
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Take for instance the shooting death of Amadou Diallo by New York City Police in 
1999. Believing Diallo matched the description of a rape suspect, four NYPD 
officers approached him outside his dimly lit apartment building.79 Diallo retreated 
towards the apartment building, despite orders to stop, and reached into his jacket 
for his wallet. Believing he was reaching for a weapon, one of the officers yelled 
“Gun!”80 At that point, 41 shots were fired, 19 of which struck Diallo.81 No weapon 
was every found at the scene.82 After a jury trial, at which all four of the officers 
were acquitted, jury interviews revealed that a major consideration in their decision 
was figuring out how a reasonable officer would act in those circumstances, and 
relied on expert testimony describing an officer’s perception of that type of 
situation.83 
It is possible in a situation such as the Diallo shooting that a drone in the place 
of an officer would change the dynamic. Jurors would not have to consider how an 
officer, seeing Diallo reach into his jacket pocket, would perceive the situation. 
Instead, the jurors would need to identify how a drone operator would perceive the 
events as they transpired, a question which is admittedly difficult to answer 
because this type of technology is not currently in use. However, removing the 
stress and anxiety associated with an imminent threat to officer safety could have a 
profound effect on the way judges and juries view an operator’s actions. 
B. Moral Disengagement  
Although the use of drones may eliminate psychological stressors that lead to 
the use of excessive force, they may in turn add new psychological pressures that 
will have to be taken into consideration.  
Over the course of their development, human beings develop certain “moral 
standards” that “serve as guides and deterrents for conduct.”84 The process of 
finding ways around these standards, and allowing oneself to carry out conduct 
contrary to them is known as moral disengagement.85 Researchers have put forth 
                                                          
79 DuCharme, supra note 76, at 2533. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 2534. 
84 Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194, available at http://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/Bandura/Bandura1999PSPR 
.pdf. 
85 Id. at 193–94. 
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many theories of what causes moral disengagement, but for drone purposes there 
are two theories that carry significant weight. 
A “disregard or distortion of consequences” theory posits that if the results of 
harmful conduct are “ignored, minimized, distorted, or disbelieved,” an 
individual’s moral standards will not be activated.86 Normally, removing oneself 
from the results of the harmful conduct carries out this process.87 When a person 
can see and hear the pain they inflict upon another, their moral standards are more 
likely to act as self-restraints.88 The opposite is true when a person is removed from 
seeing or hearing the harm. In those instances, “even a high sense of personal 
responsibility is a weak restrainer of injurious conduct.”89  
Drone use has the possibility to cause a “disregard or distortion of 
consequences.” The theory suggests that when an individual is actually present and 
applying harm, their natural moral standards provide at least some type of 
restraint.90 However, a drone operator would not be present to apply the force and, 
although they would be able to see the subject, they may not have as great of a 
sense of the harm they are causing due to a lack of physical presence, making it 
easier to actually carry out harmful conduct. Removing the officer from the 
environment, and allowing him or her view the situation through a camera lens 
leads to another disengagement theory that may have an effect on drone operators. 
The “dehumanization” theory suggests that “the joys and suffering of those 
with whom one identifies are more vicariously arousing than are those of strangers 
or of individuals who have been divested of human qualities.”91 By dehumanizing 
another person, one is viewing them as “subhuman objects,” thus making unethical 
conduct more likely to occur.92 For drone purposes, this dehumanization theory has 
created significant concern, particularly in a military context where weaponized 
drones are prevalent.93 It has been suggested that showing “abstract images,” such 
as those seen through a video camera, could dehumanize the enemy.94 Others have 
                                                          
86 Id. at 199. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Bandura, supra note 84. 
91 Id. at 200. 
92 Id. 
93 See Olsthoorn & Royakkers, supra note 7. 
94 Id. 
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stated that it could be difficult to differentiate the operating of a drone from playing 
a videogame, making the enemy or suspect more closely akin to an avatar in a 
game rather than another human being.95  
Research on military drone use provides evidence for the assertion that the 
physical and psychological distance may make killing easier.96 As stated 
previously, without weaponized police drones in use it is difficult to determine 
what, if any, effect moral disengagement and physical distance would have on a 
police drone operator. Further, there appears to be no evidence that police drones 
would ever be equipped with the kind of lethal force used by the military. The fact 
remains, however, that physical and psychological distance could have an effect on 
the actions of drone operators and their decision to use force, making both vital 
factors for courts to consider in any future litigation. 
IV. AN IMMINENT PUBLIC SAFETY STANDARD  
This Article has so far discussed what has become the traditional legal 
standard for the use of force by police, and how the introduction of an armed UAS 
could potentially change our traditional conception of these types of scenarios. The 
question now turns to how the traditional legal standard accounts for these 
technological changes. 
It is unlikely that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard is going 
to change at any time in the near future.97 This is not to say, however, that what the 
court is prepared to consider reasonable cannot change, and advancements in 
technology are often times causes for a shift in our notions of reasonableness. In 
fact, the Supreme Court in Garner explicitly stated that technological changes 
called for a shift in what was considered reasonable in regards to police use of 
force.98 Based on the changes discussed in this Article, the introduction of armed 
UAS should be a technological advancement that calls for a similar shift in what 
we consider reasonable force. 
Reasonable use of force by police is based on the way judges and juries 
perceive what the officer in question is experiencing. The Graham opinion instructs 
courts to give allowance for the environments that police find themselves, 
                                                          
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 5. 
97 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778. 
98 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8. 
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accounting for any imminent threats to the officer’s safety.99 As was demonstrated 
in the Amadou Diallo case, juries form their own perceptions of what an officer 
goes through in these situations and hear expert witness testimony describing how 
environmental factors elicit certain responses and perceptions in these types of 
scenarios. 
With these facts being known, would these uses of force still be reasonable 
when the officer is no longer physically experiencing the scenario? The fact that a 
UAS operator is not present necessarily means that the environmental factors 
affecting perceptions of the situation are absent. Taking away the consideration of 
these factors makes the use of force in many of these situations less than 
reasonable. This then gives rise to the question of how a court should determine 
whether a reasonable UAS operator would have applied a particular amount of 
force. To answer this question, it may be possible to simply adjust the guidance 
already provided by the Supreme Court. Of the suggestions put forth by the Court 
in Graham, the factor considering imminent threats to the officer’s safety and the 
allowance given for environmental factors in general are not applicable to scenarios 
involving armed UAS. Removing these points allows the test only to consider the 
severity of the crime, threat of harm to others, and whether the suspect attempts to 
evade arrest.100 These three factors, in the aggregate, ask us to consider threats to 
public safety. The more severe the crime, the more dangerous a suspect may be to 
the public, and a suspect attempting to flee may pose further harm should he 
escape. Considering this point, the standard becomes one in which an armed UAS 
should only apply force where a reasonable drone operator would do so to prevent 
an imminent threat to public safety. 
This is not a drastic departure from the current legal standard, and does not 
disturb the application of a reasonableness and totality of the circumstances 
approach of the Fourth Amendment. Yet, by narrowing the ability to actually use 
the force to circumstances involving imminent public harm, it may help to address 
some of the substantial differences that armed UAS create. The standard does not 
and would not give allowance for what an officer may perceive on the ground, 
ensuring that the court, when determining whether the application of force was 
reasonable, does not consider these perceptions. Doing this addresses the fact that 
an operator is not actually on the ground experiencing the events, and thus not 
susceptible to the same environmental factors. The court can then consider whether 
an operator who could be miles away could have reasonably recognized an 
imminent threat to public safety using factors such as the severity of the crime, 
                                                          
99 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
100 Id. 
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evidence of a weapon, or if the suspect attempts to flee. This consideration is made 
easier by the existence of a video recording of the entire incident. Much like the 
situation in Scott, this allows the judge or jury to see exactly how the encounter 
transpired, allowing them to make some determination as to whether or not the 
application of force was reasonable. 
This standard could also have some effect on preventing any moral 
disengagement concerns that may arise. As stated earlier, moral disengagement 
often occurs due to a distortion of consequences, causing a person to be detached 
from the harm they are causing to another. In a sense, causing the harm actually 
becomes easier for the person applying it. Allowing use of force by a UAS only in 
situations where there is an imminent threat to public safety may prevent this 
distortion by putting operators on alert that their actions may have serious 
consequences. Instead of being able to detach themselves from the harm, they 
would now be aware that the harm they cause can now have consequences on 
themselves if it is conducted outside the parameters of this standard. 
The standard also preserves the totality of the circumstances approach so 
clearly applied in Garner, Graham, and Scott, while simultaneously addressing 
major changes that are brought about by the introduction of armed UAS. There are 
undoubtedly other factors that would need to be considered before any new 
standard is created, and until this technology is actually put to use it is nearly 
impossible to determine what unforeseen issues may arise. With these facts in 
mind, this standard provides a simple starting point for the courts to use, preserving 
precedent and legal history while concurrently allowing for adjustment to a new 
technology that could significantly affect the landscape. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are certainly aspects of this type of technology that are not 
contemplated in this Article. The manner in which the technology is deployed, the 
system’s degree of autonomy, and the capabilities of the weaponry are all factors 
that could significantly alter any analysis on this issue. The purpose of this Article 
is to demonstrate how the introduction of armed UAS could substantially change 
the analysis of an excessive force claim and propose a solution to address these 
changes. Allowing the use of force only where a reasonable drone operator would 
recognize an imminent public danger addresses both the absence of the officer from 
the scene and possibly offset at least some of any moral disengagement problems. 
Until further research is conducted concerning the issues that these drones 
could present followed by their actual deployment in the field, it will remain 
difficult to determine how the courts will handle these situations. It is important, 
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however, that we begin to contemplate the challenges this new technology may 
pose and how our legal system will address them in the future. 
